In July 2025, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) brought charges against Jeronimo Martins Polska, owner of the Biedronka chain, 32 transport companies and eight managers and business owners. The case concerns a suspected illegal agreement to restrict the professional mobility of drivers operating Biedronka distribution centers.
According to the OCCP's findings, the entrepreneurs may have entered into so-called no-poach agreements, or agreements not to compete for employees. In practice, this meant blocking the possibility of hiring drivers by competing transport companies, even if the drivers had the necessary qualifications. Such measures were intended to protect carriers' margins by eliminating the risk of "poaching" employees and the need to offer higher wages.
A hypothetical example provided by the OCCP shows how a driver - despite his experience - was unable to find a job for three months because his candidacy was blocked under informal arrangements between the companies. As a result, employees were deprived of the opportunity to negotiate better terms of employment, while their salaries remained unchanged.
Such practices are not only unethical, but also illegal. The OCCP reminds us that participation in collusion restricting competition is punishable by a fine of up to 10% of a company's annual turnover, and managers can be fined up to PLN 2 million.
Meanwhile, if the state really wanted to counteract similar pathologies, in addition to financial penalties - which for large companies are sometimes only an operating expense - it would be advisable to consider revoking licenses or permits to practice the occupation of road carrier. According to the Law on Road Transport, the loss of good reputation by a transport entrepreneur can result in the loss of authorization to operate. And is it possible for a company that participates in a conspiracy that restricts employees' rights and acts in violation of competition laws to maintain its good reputation? A rhetorical question. Unfortunately, practice shows that institutions such as the Road Transport Inspectorate or the State Labor Inspectorate rarely take action that realistically touches the interests of stronger market participants. Drivers are left on their own, and the arrangements hold firm.
